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Ultra Vires Contracts Under
Modern Corporate Legislation
By WLLBuRT D. HA&i

N EW AND PRESSnWG problems in corporation law have tended to
push aside such traditional topics as corporate powers and the
ultra vires doctrine. Yet these subjects still form an integral part
of the law of corporations as any modem treatise or encyclopedia
on corporation law will quickly reveal.' Furthermore, the legal
consequences to be attributed to ultra vires contracts remain of
the utmost practical importance to the corporate shareholders
whose investment is at stake and to third parties whose contracts
with the corporation have been challenged. While the frequency
with which courts have been called upon to resolve ultra vires
litigation has subsided considerably in recent years even in those
jurisdictions where no specific legislation on the subject exists,
this has not removed the need or the desirability for the inclusion
in modem corporation codes of provisions designed to indicate
the legal consequences of ultra vires acts.
It was characteristic for early corporate law writers to refer
to the confusion and uncertainty which existed in this area of the
law. Clark and Marshall, for example, in their treatise on the law
of private corporations, written at the turn of this century, remarked that "there is perhaps no part of the law concerning
corporations in which we meet with so much difficulty, confusion,
and conflict of opinion as in that which relates to the effect of
ultra vires transactions."' Machen, writing a few years later and
speaking of what he referred to as the "utter confusion" in the
authorities, said that "to attempt to unravel the tangle so as to
* B.S., LL.B., University of Illinois; LL.M., Harvard University. Member of
Illinois and Kentucky Bars. Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
1 See, e.g., Fletcher, Private Corporations (perm. ed. 1931); 13 Am. Jur.,
Corporations (1938).
- 1 Clark & Marshall, Private Corporations sec. 204 (1901).
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show precisely what rules of law are adopted in each state would
be a protracted, if not impossible, task."3
These and similar early statements probably were unduly
pessimistic but the fact remains the ultra vires doctrine led to an
immense quantity of litigation in which the courts developed different theories and assumed conflicting attitudes as to the exact
legal nature of ultra vires acts. It is significant that, beginning
with Vermont in 1915, nearly one-half of the states have introduced into their corporation codes legislation designed to clarify
the treatment to be given ultra vires contracts in private litigation.
The statutory provisions involved, however, display differences
not only in wording but also in substantive content. It is the purpose of this article to survey the nature of this legislation against
the common law background with the thought that a comparative
study of existing statutes might prove of value to those charged
with the responsibility of drafting new corporation codes or
recommending amendments to existing corporation acts.
Tim COMMON LAW BACKGROUND
The confusion in the case law pertaining to ultra vires acts
referred to by the foregoing writers seems in part at least to have
resulted from a lack of precision in the meaning ascribed by
judges to the term "ultra vires." It has been said that "possibly
there is no term in the whole law used as loosely and with so little
regard to its strict meaning as the term 'ultra vires."' 4 It seems
appropriate, therefore, at the outset to focus some attention on
the meaning which should properly be given to the expression.
The term "ultra vires" has been defined, according to its strict
meaning, as referring to a contract "not within the express or implied powers of the corporation as fixed by its charter, the statutes,
or the common law."5 This definition, typical of modem definitions of the term, is obviously not self-explanatory and needs further amplification to become meaningful. It does not, for example, provide a direct answer to whether irregular exercises of
corporate power, or excessive or abusive exercises of such power,
32 Machen, Modern Law of Corporations sec. 1021 (1908). See also Thompson, "The Doctrine of Ultra Vires in Relation to Private Corporations," 28 Am. L.
Rev. 376 (1894), in which the author said of the doctrine: 'After having given a
long and attentive study to the subject, the writer affirms that the Anglo-American
law with reference to it is in a state of hopeless and inextricable confusion...."
4 7 Fletcher, Private Corporations see. 3399 (perm. ed. 1931).
5 Ibid.
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are to be considered as ultra vires, along with action for which
there is a total absence of power.
Granting that there has not always been complete agreement
as to the proper answer to such questions, it appears that under
the strict meaning of the term "ultra vires" as thus defined, those
contracts should be excluded which are unauthorized only in the
sense that the particular corporate officer who purports to execute
the contract has not the power by virtue of his office or otherwise
to act for the corporation in the matter,( and those contracts unauthorized only because some prescribed corporate formality has
not been observed but which would otherwise clearly constitute
the purposes for which the
the proper exercise of a power within
7
corporation has been organized.
It is believed, however, that those contracts which involve an
excessive exercise of corporate power should be included within
the strict meaning of the term, as, for example, where the corporate charter contains a provision limiting the highest amount of
indebtedness which the corporation may incur and the corporation borrows in excess of this debt limit. 8 In dealing with such a
case, the Kentucky Court of Appeals made the point clear when
it said:
Strictly speaking a corporate contract was at first
declared to be ultra vires only when it was entirely without
the scope and purpose of its charter privileges, and did not
pertain to the objects for which the corporation was chartered. ...

But the modem definition of such a contract

has been broadened so that the designation now includes,
not only those contracts just mentioned, but also others
which are beyond the limitations of the powers conferred
by the charter, although within the purposes contemplated
by the articles of incorporation."0
It is also believed that the strict meaning of the term should
be understood to include those contracts in which the exercise
of power in the particular instance is for an improper purpose
6 See 7 Fletcher, Private Corporations sec. 3401 (perm. ed. 1931).
7See 7 id. sec. 3402.

8 Debt limitations, particularly where prescribed by statute, may also raise
questions of illegality. In Fletcher s treatise the effect of debt limits is considered
in the chapter devoted to illegal contracts rather than in the chapter on ultra vires.
See 7 Fletcher, Private Corporations see. 3619 (perm. ed. 1931).
9 American Southern Natl Bank v. Smith, 170 Ky. 512, 186 S.W. 482 (1916).
10 Id. at 521, 186 S.W. at 485.
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although the power involved is one which could properly be
exercised if for a purpose contemplated by the corporate charter."
Suppose, for example, a corporation formed for the purpose of
distributing food products at wholesale and retail were to borrow
money to enable it to manufacture men's ties. While such a
corporation would no doubt have power to borrow money to enable it to further its food business, 2 it would not have power to
borrow money for a purpose foreign to that business and its action
in borrowing to manufacture men's ties would constitute an ultra
13
vires act.
It is important that the ultra vires contract as thus understood
be carefully distinguished from the illegal contract. Indeed,
failure to distinguish between contracts which go beyond the
powers conferred upon the corporation by its charter and contracts which violate a specific statutory prohibition so as to become malum prohibitum or which conflict with the general social
welfare so as to be malum in se may have encouraged the attitude
taken by some judges that ultra vires contracts were void and of
no legal effect. However, even if an illegal contract may also be
said to be ultra vires, it does not follow that all ultra vires con14
tracts are necessarily illegal.
There is, no doubt, some disadvantage in the use of a term
such as ultra vires which is subject to such possible variable meanings. Nevertheless, it is a useful and convenient expression to
convey the legal idea which its strict meaning embodies. Perhaps
no one has summarized the matter any more realistically than
Cook, when he said:
This term has been objected to as having no fixed
and clear meaning, and to some extent this objection is
reasonable. There is no other term, however, that has
acquired the significance, general use, and peculiar meaning that are attached to the words ultra vires; and consequently the term probably has acquired a permanent place
in the vocabulary of corporation law.15
11 See 7 Fletcher, Private Corporations sec. 3550 (perm. ed. 1931).
12 See 6 Fletcher, Private Corporations see. 2610 (repl. vol. 1950).
13 See 6 id. sec. 2611.
14This distinction was recognized and discussed by Judge Comstock in the
early New York case of Bissell v. The Michigan S. & N. I. R.R. Cos., 22 N.Y. 258,
268-74 (1860).
15 2 Cook, Corporations sec. 667 (6th ed. 1908).
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The development which caused the ultra vires contract to
take on such an aura of importance was the notion that such contracts were void and of no legal effect. This idea gained a firm
foothold in American jurisprudence with the decision handed
down by the Supreme Court of the United States in Central
TransportationCo. v. Pullman'sPalace Car Co.,16 wherein Justice
Gray said:
A contract of a corporation, which is ultra vires,
in the proper sense, that is to say, outside the object of its
creation as defined in the law of its organization, and therefore beyond the powers conferred upon it by the legislature,
is not voidable only, but wholly void, and of no legal effect.
The objection to the contract is, not merely that the corporaought not to have made it, but that it could not make
tion
17
it.

This view as to the nature of the ultra vires contract became
the settled rule in the federal courts and was adopted by several
state courts."8 A number of grounds were offered in support of
this doctrine, none of which have proven completely satisfactory,
thereby greatly weakening the strength of the "federal rule" and
inducing courts to introduce exceptions and qualifications to the
doctrine. Fletcher's current treatise on the law of private corporations lists the following five grounds as having been offered in
support of the doctrine: (1) want of corporate power to make the
contract, (2) illegality, (3) notice of the limitations on corporate
power, (4) public policy, and (5) protection of the rights of
stockholders. 9
These grounds have been thoroughly analyzed by other writers
on the subject of ultra vires,2 0 and there is, therefore, no desire
to undertake a new and independent analysis of them at this time.
Nevertheless, it is believed that some discussion of each of the
five grounds is desirable as a means of providing a more complete
10 139 U.S. 24 (1890).

17Id, at 59.
'8 Stevens lists cases from the following states as having adopted the so-called
federal rule: Alabama, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, Tennessee, and Vermont. Stevens, Private Corporations sec. 70 n. 51
(2nd ed. 1949). Three of these states, Illinois, Maryland, and Vermont, have
enacted legislation on the subject.
197 Fletcher, Private Corporations sec. 3406 (perm. ed. 1931).
20 See, e.g., the excellent review and analysis by Professor C. E. Carpenter
entitled, "Should the Doctrine of Ultra Vires Be Discarded?," 33 Yale L.J. 49

(1923).
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understanding of the common law background and a better appreciation of the legislative treatment of the subject.
The first of these grounds, want of corporate power, is a
logical deduction from the fiction and concession theories of
corporate existence, that is, from the conception of the corporation as an artificial entity deriving its existence from the state. It
is reasoned that the corporation has only such powers as are given
it by its creator and thus has no capacity to exceed these powers.'
Whatever merit this argument may have had at a time when
corporations were created by special acts of the legislature, it is
abundantly clear today that it has little merit under modem general incorporation acts where persons are free to decide for themselves what the nature of their corporation shall be and what
powers it shall have.22 Furthermore, the use of the word "power"
is a misnomer. What the law actually is concerned with is not
"power" but "authority." As the late Professor Ballantine put it
"when it is said that a corporation is a 'person' invested with
certain 'corporate powers', this really means that the management
is invested by the agreement of those who form it, and those who
become members of it, with authority to carry on activities incidental to certain lines of business."2 3 If, then, corporate power

is a question of "authority" rather than "capacity," it is not true
as Justice Gray tried to say in the CentralTransportationCo. case
that the objection to the contract is "not merely that the corpora21 See 2 Machen, Modem Law of Corporations see. 1018 (1908); 2 Morawetz,
Private Corporations sec. 649 (2d ed. 1886). The limited capacity doctrine is
explainable also in part on the deduction the English House of Lords made in
Ashbury Ry. Co. v. Riche, L.R. 7 H.L. 653 (1875), as to a legislative intention
in the Companies Acts that a company so incorporated should keep within the
powers as limited in its memorandum of association. This placed corporations
incorporated under the Companies Acts in the same position as those created by
special act of incorporation, where it had been established that all acts in excess
of the granted powers were void. See 2 Machen, op. cit. supra, sec. 1027. This
explanation has considerable significance in relation to modem ultra vires legislation because as Stevens has said: "To the extent that the ultra vires muddle is
attributable to a judicially inferred legislative intention, it can be clarified by more

explicit legislation." Stevens, Private Corporations sec. 73, at 334 (2d ed. 1949).
22 See Stevens, Private Corporations sec. 47, at 231 (2d ed. 1949); Carpenter,
supra note 20, at 59.
23 Ballantine, Corporations sec. 90, at 245 (rev. ed. 1946). For a similar
analysis, see Stevens, Private Corporations sec. 47 (2d ed. 1949), wherein the
author concludes that, as applied to ordinary business corporations, "the chief
significance of corporate authority is that it indicates the contractual limitations
placed by the body of shareholders upon the authority of a portion of the shareholders, the board of directors, and the officers, to act on behalf of the entire
membership."
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ion ought not to have made it, but that it could not make it."2

Instead it becomes evident that the corporation, acting through
its representatives,
could make the contract, but ought not to have
25
done so.
Illegality furnishes poor support for the ultra vires doctrine
since, as already indicated, an ultra vires act as such is not an
illegal act. A more specific prohibition must exist in the laws of
the state for the act to take on the flavor of illegality.2 6 Nor is such
prohibition to be found in the provisions contained in many
corporation statutes both past and present which state that no
corporation shall engage in business other than that expressly
authorized by its articles of incorporation or the law under which
it was organized. -7 It would be possible to conclude from such
provisions that any transaction which is not within the purposes
as expressed in the articles, or necessarily incidental to the carrying out of those purposes, is void and of no effect because it would
become a prohibited act and thereby an illegal act. Instead, however, such statutory provisions have been treated as merely declaratory of the common law rule on which the ultra vires doctrine
itself was based. 28 Such an act, then, does not become an illegal
act under these statutory provisions, and the common law rules
pertaining to the legal consequences of ultra vires acts remain
unaffected."
24 See notes 16 and 17 supra.
25 See 7 Fletcher, Private Corporations sec. 8424 (perm. ed. 1931).

26 See, e.g., Hind v. Cook & Co., 202 Ky. 526, 260 S.W. 349 (1924), in which
the Kentucky court held that a specific prohibition in the statutes under which a
co-operative or assessment fire insurance company was organized restricting it to
the insurance of buildings and property within the limits of the territory prescribed in its certificate of incorporation indicated a public policy which made
prohibited contracts more than merely ultra vires.
27 See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. sec. 271.145 (1956). This mandate sometimes, as
in Kentucky, finds expression in the state constitution as well. See Ky. Const.
sec. 192.
28See Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Missouri Poultry & Game Co., 287 Mo.
400, 229 S.W. 813, 815-16 (1921), in which Judge Blair collected and discussed
the authorities in support of this interpretation.
20 See Bailey, 'Need for Revision of the Texas Corporation Statutes," 8 Baylor
L. Rev. 1, 6-7 (1950). The author called attention in this article to the strict
interpretation which Texas courts had been putting upon the statutory provision
then in effect in that state that corporations could "enter into any obligation or
contract essential to the transaction of its authorized business." He recommended
that the wording of this provision be changed so as to "assure to business corporations the authority to enter into any contract, or to perform any act, which may
reasonably seem to directors of ordinary judgment and prudence to be necessary
or expedient in accomplishing the authorized purpose of the corporation." (Emphasis added.)
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The third ground suggested for treating ultra vires contracts
as void, namely, notice of the limitations on corporate power, has
been subjected to as severe criticism as the first two. The idea
behind this attempted explanation of the doctrine is that third
parties who contract with a corporation are on constructive notice
of the extent of corporate power and so act at their peril.30 The
suggestion has been made that the existence of this concept of
notice may have been in part a result of the misconception of ultra
vires contracts as illegal.3 ' It is then tempting to apply the criminal law maxim that "everyone is presumed to know the law. 32
But, as Professor Stevens has observed, application of the doctrine
of constructive notice cannot be supported by analogy to this
principle in criminal law since "ultra vires action is not criminal
action."3 3 Another explanation for the existence of the notice

concept is the suggestion offered by Stevens that courts evidently
misconceived the real purpose served by the legislative requirement that articles of incorporation be filed in a public office, and
should have realized that the purpose to be served by such filing
is not to charge the public with knowledge as in the case of
ordinary recording acts, but rather is to provide a public record
of information available to those who may wish to ascertain the
data contained in the papers so ffled."4 Moreover, from the practical standpoint, the use of the constructive notice concept has
been found particularly objectionable. In the first place, the point
has been made that it is unrealistic and contrary to actual business
30 See, e.g., American So. Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 170 Ky. 512, 522, 186 S.W.

482, 486 (1916), in which the Kentucky court gave the following reply to the
suggestion of defendant (American Southern National Bank) that it was an innocent party with no knowledge of the limitations on the highest amount of indebtedness contained in the articles of incorporation of a bank to which it made
a loan of money secured by collateral: "It may be true that the defendant did not
have actual notice of the limitations in the charter of the Alexander bank, but
under all of the authorities, including the cases upon the subject from this court,
it was charged, at the time of the lending of the money with constructive notice
of such limitations." For a discussion of the constructive notice doctrine in early
Kentucky cases, see Note, "Ultra Vires as a Corporate Defense," 30 Ky. L.T 224
225-27 (1942). This doctrine was specifically abolished by the Kentucky Genera
Assembly in 1946 when a new revised general corporation law was adopted. See
Ky. Rev.
Stat. sec. 271.115 (1956).
31
Colson, "The Doctrine of Ultra Vires in United States Supreme Court Decisions," 42 W. Va. L. Quat. 179, 297, 298 (1936).
82 See I Burdick, Law of Crime sec. 184 (1946).
33 Stevens, Private Corporations sec. 74, at 338 (2d ed. 1949); Stevens "A
Proposal as to the Codification and Restatement of the Ultra Vires Doctrine,' 36
Yale L.J. 297, 324 (1927).
34 Ibid.
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practices to suppose that persons dealing with a corporation can
be expected to know the contents of the articles of incorporation. 35
In the second place, it has been observed that even if such persons
actually did acquire such knowledge, they would be subject at
their peril to deciding whether given action does or does not
come within the enumerated purposes or powers of the corporation.-" Since such decisions often cannot be made with assurance
even by lawyers, it is obviously asking much of the business man
to shoulder the responsibility for such decisions in his dealings
with corporations.
Public policy has sometimes been thought to dictate the necessity of treating the ultra vires contract as void. It can be reasoned
that the state, representing the interests of the general public and
the welfare of society, has an interest in corporations keeping
within the bounds of the business which they have been organized to pursue and that this social policy is furthered by refusing
to give legal recognition to the ultra vires contract. 37 This argument has appeal, and to the extent that the particular contract is
illegal as well as ultra vires, there may well be a public policy
which is best served by treating the contract as void, but it has
been observed that, if the only objection to the contract is the
lack of authority on the part of the corporation to enter into such
a contract, then it may be questioned whether there is any public
welfare which is served by striking down the contract, particularly
when the corporation could receive the necessary authority by
simply amending the articles of incorporation.3 8 Instead, the real
public policy, it is argued, seems to point in the direction of upholding the sanctity of contract in commercial transactions. 9
The fifth and final ground mentioned in Fletcher's treatise for
treating the ultra vires contract as void, namely, the protection
of the rights of the stockholders, 40 probably furnishes the strong35 See Colson, supra note 31, at 297.
36 See Carpenter, supra note 20, at 62; Colson, supra note 31, at 297-98.

See Stevens, Private Corporations sec. 72 (2d ed. 1949).
8 Carpenter, supra note 20, at 63-64. See also Stevens, Private Corporations
see. 72,
3 0 at 326 (2d ed. 1949).
Carpenter, supra note 20, at 64. See also Stevens, Private Corporations
see. 72, at 326 (2d ed. 1949). In speaking of the supposed public policy behind
the ultra vires doctrine Senator Estes Kefauver once said: "Public policy is generally vague and untrue. There is also a public policy to prevent men and corporations from breaking their fair contracts." Kefauver, "The Doctrine of Ultra Vires,"
37
3

6 Tenn.
40 L. Rev. 20, 27 (1927).

Another ground sometimes suggested is the protection of intra vires
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est argument that can be made in support of the ultra vires doctrine under modem incorporation procedure which, through its
flexible provisions, minimizes the outside public interest and em41
phasizes the specific interests of the inside group of associates.
However, while it may be conceded that the inside associates, in
their role as stockholders, have a real and active interest in the
corporation confining its activities to those specified in the articles,
yet as between such persons and those who have dealt with the
corporation in good faith with no reason to suspect the transaction
is unauthorized, there are strong reasons for placing the risk on
the insiders rather than on the innocent third parties. It has been
persuasively argued that such a business risk would be placed on
an individual principal under the law of agency, as well as on
partners under the law of partnership, and that there seems to be
no good reason for applying a different principle to stockholders
in the case of a corporation.42
It is obvious from this brief resum6 of the ultra vires doctrine
and the reasons offered in support of it, that it was a doctrine
which rested on a rather unstable foundation from the very start
and which could readily lead to harsh and unjust results if applied literally. It is not surprising, therefore, that the judicial
climate tended to become unfavorable as more and more courts
were faced with the inherent injustice of the doctrine. Judges
began to include in their opinions expressions such as, that "the
creditors. But it appears their rights depend upon, and their interests are usually
adequately protected by, the law of fraudulent conveyances. See Ballantine,
Corporations sec. 104 (rev. ed. 1946); Stevens, Private Corporations see. 75
(2d ed. 1949). Intra vires creditors ordinarily, therefore, have no standing to
challenge a transaction as ultra vires merely on that ground alone. See Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Kentucky Public Elevator Co., 217 Ky. 48, 288 S.W. 1024 (1926)
(unsecured subsequent creditor not allowed to raise question whether contract
for storage of tank cars by elevator company, giving it a lien for storage, was ultra
vires especially where cars were not fit for transportation and storage was cheaper
than demurrage). In Kentucky, however, where insolvency intervenes, it has been
held that general creditors can prevent a mortgagee of corporate property from
enforcing its mortgage in prirority to their claims for an amount in excess of the
debt limit named in the articles of association. Bell & Coggeshall Co. v. Kentucky
Glass Works Co., 106 Ky. 7, 50 S.W. 2, 51 S.W. 180 (1899). This and other
Kentucky decisions construing the rights of creditors under debt limit provisions
are referred to and discussed in 7 Fletcher, Private Corporations see. 8619 (penn.
ed. 1931).
41 This emphasis has not always been so recognized. See, e.g., 2 Morawetz,
Private Corporations sec. 692, at 659 (2d ed. 1886), in which it is said: "The
legal prohibition against the unauthorized exercise of corporate powers is established for the benefit of the public, on general grounds of expediency, and not for
the benefit of corporations, or of persons dealing with them.'
42 Carpenter, supra note 20, at 65-66.
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defense of ultra vires, whether invoked for or against a corporation, is not favored in the law,"43 and that "it should never be applied where it will defeat the ends of justice, if such a result can
be avoided."44
In the face of such a judicial attitude, it was inevitable that
modifications in the application of the doctrine would be introduced. It became well settled that a fully executed ultra vires
contract would be left untouched.45 This position was accepted
even by those courts which had adopted the "federal rule,"46
however illogical this may have been under the view that an ultra
vires contract is void. In the interest of security of titles, the
courts also uniformly agreed that no attack should be permitted
on a corporation's title to property acquired in an ultra vires transaction.4 Furthermore, as to those contracts which had been
executed on one side ouly, a majority of the state courts took the
position that the contract should be enforced at the instance of
the party who had performed, at least if the benefits of the per48
formance had been received by the other contracting party.
43 See, e.g., Community Credit Union, Inc. v. Connors, 141 Conn. 301, 105
A. 2d44772, 774 (1954).
See, e.g., Palm Beach Estates v. Croker, 106 Fla. 617, 143 So. 792, 802
(1932). These two expressions can be traced to the language of Justice Swayne
in San Antonio v. Mehaffy, 96 U.S. 312, 315 (1877). He in turn seems to have
relied upon what was said by Judge Allen in the New York case of Whitney Arms
Co. v. Barlow, 63 N.Y. 62, 69 (1875). In Behrens v. First Nat'l Bank, 305 ]1M.
A pp. 215, 27 N.E. 2d 333, 336 (1940), the Illinois court commented that "The
rule of
45 ultra vires is not intended as a license for commercial piracy."
See, e.g., Reimann v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 191 La. 1079, 187
So. 30 (1939); Memphis Lumber Co. v. Security Bank & Trust Co., 143 Tenn. 136,
226 S.W. 182 (1920). The authorities are collected in 7 Fletcher, Private Corporations see. 3497 (penn. ed. 1931, supp. 1956).
46 See, e.g., Long v. Georgia Pac. fy. Co., 91 Ala. 519, 8 So. 706 (1891);
Montrose Perpetual Bldg. Ass n v. Page, 143 Md. 631, 123 AtI. 68 (1923);
Memphis Lumber Co. v. Security Bank & Trust Co., supra note 45.
47 See Stevens, Private Corporations sec. 65 (2d ed. 1949). A few states
still have statutory or constitutional provisions which authorize the state to forfeit
land held by a corporation in violation of authority. See, e.g., Ky. Const. sec. 192:
No corporation shall engage in business other than that
expressly authorized by its charter, or the law under which it may
have been or hereafter may be organized, nor shall it hold any real
estate, except such as may be proper and necessary for carrying on
its legitimate business, for a longer period than five years, under
penalty of escheat. (Emphasis added.)
See also Ky. Rev. Stat. 271.145 (1956) which repeats this constitutional provision and augments it by outlining the procedure to be followed by the state in
bringing
48 actions to escheat such real estate.
See, e.g., Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Missouri Poultry & Game Co., 287
Mo. 400, 229 S.W. 813 (1921). For a collection of authorities from the jurisdictions in which this view prevaids, see 7 Fletcher, Private Corporations sec. 3479
(pern. ed. 1931, supp. 1956).
The Kentucky court appears to have aligned itself with the majority rule. One
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It was said that the nonperforming party was "estopped" to set
up the plea of ultra vires. 49 The courts following the "federal
rule," although unwilling to permit recovery on the contract, were
willing to concede a recovery in quasi-contract by the performing

party based on the value of any benefits received by the other
contracting party as the result of performance. 0

Despite these inroads on the ultra vires doctrine, the almost
unanimous position of the courts has been that the purely
executory ultra vires contract cannot be enforced.5 1 The only
breach known to the writer in the consistent line of authority for
this proposition appears in Harris v. Independence Gas Co.,

where the Supreme Court of Kansas, making a clean break with
of the clearest expressions of this view appears in Liberty Coal Mining Co. v.
Frankel Coal Co., 206 Ky. 647, 653, 268 S.W. 280, 282 (1924). In Greene v.
Middlesborough Town & Lands Co., 121 Ky. 355, 89 S.W. 228 (1905), the court
sustained the plea of ultra vires by defendant corporation in a suit against it on a
contract of guaranty. While the opiion contains overtones suggestive of the
federal rule, it is significant that the evidence established that the defendant
corporation never received nor retained anything of value under the contract. See
also Louisa Nat'l Bank v. Sparks, 268 Ky. 158, 104 S.W. 2d 223 (1937) (semble).
The Kentucky court has also recognized one of the ramifications of the majority
state rule, viz., the possibility of assent to, or ratification of, ultra vires acts by all
of the shareholders. See Lincoln Court Realty Co. v. Kentucky Title Sav. Bank &
Trust Co., 169 Ky. 840, 185 S.W. 156 (1916). This possibility has been denied
under the federal rule. See Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car
Co., 139 U.S. 24, 59-60 (1890), in which Justice Gray said: "The contract cannot
be ratified by either party, because it could not have been authorized by either."
In Shannon's Co-Ex'rs v. Shannon Spring Bed Mfg. Co., 313 Ky. 463, 230 S.W.
2d 457 (1950), the Kentucky court held that where a stockholder had participated
in a corporate transaction, neither he nor his executors could later challenge the
transaction
as ultra vires.
49
See Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Missouri Poultry & Game Co., supra note
48. The estoppel rationale, however, is not entirely satisfactory as an explanation
for this result. While it may be argued that in suits by third parties against the
corporation, the corporate representatives in dealing with the third party have
held out or represented that the corporation has power to contract for the purpose
contemplated, the constructive notice doctrine makes it difficult for the third
party to meet the reliance requirement. In suits by the corporation against third
parties, it is difficult to talk estoppel since it is evident that third parties will have
made no representations to the corporation concerning its powers on which it will
have relied to its detriment. See Colson, supra note 31, at 317. Nevertheless, the
majority of the state courts have not hesitated to enforce the "partially executed"
ultra vires contract whether the suit be by the corporation or by the third party.
50 See Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Central Transportation Co., 171 U.S. 138
(1898); Simmons v. Farmers Union Co-op. Ass'n, 114 Neb. 463, 208 N.W. 144
(1926). See also Consolidated Nat. Bank v. Anglo & London Paris Nat. Bank, 34
Ariz. 160, 269 Pac. 68 (1928); Roxana Petroleum Co. v. Covington State Bank,
132 Okla. 221, 269 Pac. 1100 (1928); Tennessee Ice Co. v. Raine, 107 Tenn. 151,
64 S.W. 29 (1901).
51 See National Finance Co. v. Cramer, 156 Minn. 79, 194 N.W. 108 (1923)
7 Fletcher, Private Corporations sec. 3459 (penn. ed. 1931) and cases cited
therein.
52 76 Kan. 750, 92 Pac. 1123 (1907).
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the ultra vires doctrine, declared that, in the absence of special
circumstances affecting the matter, "neither party to even an
executory contract should be allowed to defeat its enforcement
by the plea of ultra vires."5 3
The question then becomes, why the need for legislation on
the subject of ultra vires? After all, with the possible exception
of the wholly executory ultra vires contract, the courts themselves
have attempted to correct the undesirable consequences of the
doctrine. It may be asked, should not further corrective treatment therefore be left in the hands of the judiciary?
There are several considerations which suggest a negative
answer to this latter question and which explain the need for
corrective legislation. In the first place the courts have not consistently recognized the modification as to "partially executed"
contracts nor have they been uniform in their application of the
"estoppel" theory, particularly with regard to the receipt of benefits limitation. 4 Furthermore, the judiciary has shown no inclination to accept the position adopted by the Kansas court as to the
purely executory ultra vires contract. This may be because the
decision in that case came too late, for while it is an early case
when looked back upon today, it came at a late stage in the development of the common law rules after those rules had tended
to crystallize and even impelled Machen to comment that "at this
late day a court which takes this position without any aTfrmative
legislative sanction would seem to be almost if not quite guilty
of usurping the functions of the legislature." 5 Yet the same considerations of justice and business policy which justify allowing a
party the benefit of his bargain, that is, recovery on the contract,
53 92 Pac. at 1127-28.
54 The usual view is that in the absence of evidence of benefits accruing to
the nonperforming party, there can be no estoppel. See, e.g., L. G. Balfour Co.
v. Gossett, 131 Tex. 348, 115 S.W. 2d 594 (1938); Zion's Sav. Bank & Trust Co.
v. Tropic & East Fork Irr. Co., 102 Utah 101, 126 P. 2d 1053 (1942); Millett v.

Mackie Mill Co., 193 Wash. 477, 76 P. 2d 311 (1938). This requirement has
been criticized as illogical since the basis for the doctrine of estoppel is detriment
suffered rather than benefit received. Ballantine, Corporations sec. 95, at 251
(rev. ed. 1946). Questions also arise as to the character of the benefit received,
some courts insisting that the benefit derived be direct and immediate and not
merely indirect and remote. See e.g., L. G. Balfour Co. v. Cossett, supra. For a
discussion of New York cases in relation to the question whether the benefit must
be proportionate" to the liability sought to be imposed, see Note, "Some Aspects
of tle New York Doctrine of Ultra Vires Contracts, 29 Colum. L. Rev. 484
(1929).
55 2 Machen, Modem Law of Corporations sec. 1058 (1908).
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in the case of the partially executed contract seem likewise to
apply to the wholly executory contract.56 As said by Judge Mason
in the Kansas case:
It might seem reasonable that a system which attempts not only to protect a party to an ultra vires contract
from actual loss, but, where equity requires it, to insure to
him the actual fruits of his bargain, ought, for the sake of
completeness and symmetry, to enable him to insist upon
the performance even of a purely executory contract. It
certainly seems against conscience that one who has entered
into a contract in the expectation of deriving a profit from
it, may, upon discovering the probability of a loss, repudiate
by raising the question of want
it, and escape responsibility
57
of corporate capacity.
Another unsatisfactory aspect of the judicial treatment of ultra
vires contracts, growing out of the distinctions based on the extent
of performance under the contract, has been the inability of the
courts to agree upon whether a particular contract falls into the
executed or executory category. This has proven especially difficult with reference to mortgages and leases."6 Yet under the
common law rules the rights of the parties are influenced by
the designation given the contract.
Finally, it may be noted that despite the willingness of courts
to consider abuse of power as well as want of power as coming
within the strict meaning of ultra vires, some courts have tended
to be much more receptive to the enforceability of contracts involving a mere abuse of granted power as distinguished from
those involving a total absence of such power. A recent case
from Massachusetts,"9 which traditionally has been a federal rule
jurisdiction," illustrates this tendency. The president and treasurer of a theatre corporation, whose charter empowered it, among
other things, to own, maintain, and operate "theatres, concert
halls, buildings and places of amusement," contracted for the repair and remodeling of a theatre building which he stated his
corporation had "taken over" but which the corporation in fact
56 See Colson, supra note 31, at 318.
57 Harris v. Independence Gas Co., 76 Kan. 750, 92 Pac. 1123, 1124 (1907).
58 See 7 Fletcher, Private Corporations secs. 3534-3547 (perm. ed. 1931).
59 Wiley & Foss, Inc. v. Saxony Theatres, Inc. 139 N.E.2d 400 (Mass. 1957).

60 See Peairs, "Corporate Powers in Massachusetts," 28 B.U.L. Rev. 801, 326
(1948); note, 16 B.U.L. Rev. 194 (1936). But see W. W. Britton, Inc. v. S. M.
Hill Co., 327 Mass. 335, 98 N.E.2d 637 (1951).
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did not own or control. In a suit by the contractor against the
corporation to recover for the cost of the work done under the
contract, the court denied the defendant corporation the right
to avail itself of the ultra vires defense, saying:
Our cases, however, make a distinction between
the exercise by a corporation of powers manifestly outside
the general authority granted by its charter, and the exercise
of powers which, although of the sort which in general the
corporation possesses, have been abused in the particular
case. In the latter case if the abuse of corporate authority
is unknown to the party dealing with the corporation 61the
defense of ultra vires is not available to the corporation.
It has been doubted whether such a distinction as this can
be justified since "in either case, the contract would be equally
within the general common law prohibition against all unauthorized corporate action." 2 Nevertheless, as one writer suggested,
it has ptovided the courts with a convenient "loophole" from the
severity of the ultra vires doctrine. 3
The foregoing considerations should suffice to demonstrate the
inadequacy of the judicial rules on the subject of ultra vires and
the need which has existed for remedial legislation as a means
of improving the law in this area. It has been said that "the
limitations that stare decisis imposes upon the judicial power to
improve the law appear to be such that the formulation of satisfactory rules governing ultra vires transactions awaits action by
the legislature,"6 4 and that "the unsatisfactory jumble of case law
6 139 N.E. 2d at 402-03. Note that the plaintiff was allowed to recover
despite the absence of any benefits received by the defendant corporation from
the performance of the services. On the question whether receipt of benefits is
necessary under the rule allowing recovery in partially executed contracts where
there has been abuse of power, see 7 Fletcher, Private Corporations sec. 3562
(perm. ed. 1931).
62 2 Morawetz, Private Corporations sec. 704 (2d ed. 1886).
See also 1
Clark & Marshall, Private Corporations sec. 214(c) (1901).
63 Note, "The Mississippi Court and the Doctrine of Ultra Vires," 10 Miss. LJ.
293, 298-99 (1938). See also Illinois Business Corporation Act Annotated 69-71
(2d ed. 1947), in which it is pointed out that the Illinois courts found the distinction between want' of power and "abuse' of power useful as a means of tempering the
64 harshness of their "void" doctrine.
Belsbeim, "The Need for Revising the Texas Corporation Statutes," 27
Texas L. Rev. 659, 665 (1949). A good example of this judicial inertia appears
in the case of Hamburg Bank v. Ouachita Nat. Bank, 78 F.2d 100, 106 (8th Cir.
1935), where the court, in denying recovery to a third party on an ultra vires contract from which the corporation had received no tangible benefit, said that, despite
the harshness of the result, "the settled law cannot be unsettled in order to rescue
one who has been improvident from his own inadvertencies."
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on this subject can be remedied only by a major operation performed by the legislature."65 The legislatures have responded by
enacting statutes directed at the problem, but as Professor Baker
of the Harvard University Law School once remarked, "both the
underlying theory and the methods and phrasing of some of these
statutes raise challenging questions." 6
LEGIsLATioN

The first state to attempt legislation on the subject of ultra
vires in private litigation was the state of Vermont, which enacted
a statute in 1915. The substance of this statute, still a part of the
corporation law of that state, is that any act authorized or ratified
by the board of directors is to be regarded as the act of the
corporation for which the corporation is to be liable, even though
such act may be ultra vires, provided a corporation with authority
to do such an act might have been67 formed under the laws of that
state at the time the act was done.
This statute, as such, is obviously not a complete treatment of
the ultra vires doctrine, for while it abolishes the defense in suits
brought against the corporation, it says nothing about the defense
in suits brought by the corporation. If this is meant to keep open
the defense to a third party when sued by the corporation without
regard to the understanding which the third party had with reference to the propriety of the transaction when he entered into the
contract, it may seem a bit drastic in its treatment of the corpora-

tion and its shareholders.68 The statute does have the merit, however, of protecting the interests of third party plaintiffs in all types
of contracts, whether they are wholly executory, partially executed, or fully executed. Another feature of the statute which
makes it an incomplete treatment of the subject is its failure to
recognize or account for the well-established right of nonassenting
shareholders to bring a suit against the offending officers or direc65
Ballantine, 'Troblems in Drafting a Modem Corporation Law," 17 A.B.A.J.
579, 66
580 (1931).
Baker, "Hildebrand on Texas Corporations-A Review," 21 Texas L. Rev.

169, 175 (1942).
67 Vt. Stat. tit. 26, see. 5789 (1947).
68 See Ballantine, Corporations sec. 108, at 264 (rev. ed. 1946), where, speaking of the Vermont statute, the author says: "This in effect abolishes the doctrine
of ultra vires as to lack of authority under the purpose clause as between the
corporation and outsiders, although it is not made entirely clear that the corporation will be entitled to enforce rights in respect of such acts.
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tors either to enjoin threatened ultra vires action or to recover
damages resulting from the parrying on of such transactions.
It was not until twelve years later, in 1927, that any further

attempt was made to legislate on the subject. In that year Ohio
adopted a new General Corporation Act which contained pro-

visions directed at the ultra vires problem.

9

The following year

a Uniform Business Corporation Act was approved by the Na70
tibnal Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
and this act likewise contained provisions designed to cope with
71

the problem.

The treatment accorded the doctrine in these two acts is
similar but not identical. Both attempted to dispel the historical
fallacy that a corporation is a creature of limited capacity by providing that corporations shall have the capacity possessed by
specifically abolished the
natural persons. 2 Both acts likewise
73

doctrine of constructive notice.

The intent in the Uniform Act was to guide the courts by
means of such provisions toward the use of agency principles in
69 See Ohio Gen. Code Ann. sees. 8623-8, 8623-9 (1934).

70 See 9 U.L.A. 115 (1957). This act has since been designated a Model Act
but will continue to be referred to herein as a Uniform Act to distinguish it from
the Model Business Corporation Act prepared by the Committee on Business
Corporations of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the
American Bar Association.
71 See sections 10 and 11 of the act, 9 U.L.A. 140, 142 (1957).
72
Seection 77, Uniform Business Corporation Act, 9 U.L.A. 142 (1957);
Ohio Gen. Code Ann. see. 8623-8 (1934).\ The provision in the Uniform Act reads:
A corporation which has been formed under this Act, or a
corporation which existed at the time this Act took effect and of a
class which might be formed under this act, shall have the capacity
to act possessed by natural persons, but such a corporation shall have
authority to perform only such acts as are necessary or proper to acpurposes and which are not repugnant to law.
complishits
73 See Section 10, Uniform Business Corporation Act, 9 U.L.A. 140 (1957);
Ohio Gen. Code Ann. sec. 8623-9 (1934). The provision in the Uniform Act says:
The filing or recording of the articles of incorporation, or
amendments thereto, or of any other papers pursuant to the provisions
of this Act is required for the purpose of affording all persons the
opportunity of acquiring knowledge of the contents thereof, but no
person dealing with the corporation shall be charged with constructive
notice of the contents of any such articles or papers by reason of such
filing or recording.
The Michigan statute on constructive notice excepts from its operation shareholders, officers, and directors of the corporation. See 3 Mich. Comp. Laws see.
450.9 (1948). The late Justice Wiley B. Rutledge, Jr., of the United States
Supreme Court, writing while Dean of the College of Law, State University of
Iowa, particularly commended this exception with regard to officers and directors
since he felt they should be expected to know something about their articles and
"ordinarily should not be permitted to hide behind a shield of ignorance regarding
their contents." Rutledge, "Significant Trends in Modem Incorporation Statutes,
22 Wash. U.L.Q. 305, 319 (1937).
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the solution of ultra vires problems.1 4 Under this approach the
provisions in the articles of incorporation setting forth the objects
or purposes of the corporation would operate as limitations placed
by the shareholders on the authority of their chosen representatives to act for them in transacting the business affairs of the
corporation, but would not affect the rights of third parties unless
they knew or should have known that such limitations existed.75
Professor Stevens, the draftsman for the Uniform Act, had become
a leading exponent of the agency theory, and had recommended
it as the most satisfactory basis for legislative treatment of the
ultra vires doctrine.7 6 It was his belief that the two foremost
obstacles to using agency principles were the doctrines of limited
capacity and constructive notice, and that by eliminating these
concepts, the way would be open for courts to solve ultra vires
litigation by applying agency law.
The Ohio Act, however, went a step further and contained a
provision directed specifically at the legal effects of ultra vires
transactions in private litigation. It read:
No limitation on the exercise of the authority of
the corporation shall be asserted in any action between the
corporation and any person, except by or on behalf of the
or person having
corporation against a director or an officer
78
actual knowledge of such limitation.
Under a provision such as this collateral attack upon the
propriety of a corporate contract is permitted in but two instances: (1) suits by the corporation against its directors or officers, and (2) suits between the corporation and third persons
with actual knowledge of the scope of the authorized business
activity. Furthermore, it will be noted that in the latter instance
the defense is available only to the corporation and not to third
parties. The states of Kansas, 79 Michigan,"0 and Minnesota8l have
74

See Commissioners' Note to Section 11 of the Uniform Act, 9 U.L.A. 148

(1957).

75See Recent Legis., Ballantine, "Legislative Developments in Corporation
Law," 15 Calif. L. Rev. 422, 422-24 (1927).
76See Stevens, "A Proposal as to the Codification and Restatement of the
Ultra Vires Doctrine," 36 Yale L.J. 297 (1927).

77 bid.

78 Ohio Gen. Code Ann. sec. 8623-8 (1934).
79 Kans. Gen.Stat. Ann. sec. 17-4101 (1949).
803 Mich. Comp. Laws sec. 450.11 (1948).
812 Minn. Stat. sec. 801.12 (1953).
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enacted similar statutes with "knowledge" clauses, all of which
limit the use of the defense to the corporation.
The "knowledge" clauses have been the source of comment
both as to their intended scope and as to their intrinsic merit, for
while it may seem only fair and just to deny a third party who
has knowledge the privilege of asserting such a defense when
sued by the corporation, it may not be so clear that such a party
should be subjected to the defense in his suit against the corporation when he has fully performed on his part. 2 The mere fact of
knowledge on the part of the third party does not lead to the
necessary inference of moral wrongdoing on his part since his
dealings may have been based on the possibility of ratification
or assent by the shareholders.8 3 Professor Jennings, commenting
on the "knowledge" provision in the Minnesota Business Corporation Act suggested that, since under a prior Minnesota decision it
had been held that a corporation could not use the defense against
a third person who had fully performed even though with knowledge, the act should not be held to require a contrary result.
Otherwise, it would have the effect of creating the defense where
it had not theretofore existed. 84 On the other hand, at the other
extreme, Professor Stevens has observed that the limitation of the
"knowledge" clause to actualknowledge interferes with the operation of accepted principles of agency law. He says:
Giving free play to the usual rules of agency, the
corporation should be permitted to defend itself against a
third person, who, as a prudent man, ought to have acquired knowledge as to the material facts concerning corporate authority recorded both for his benefit and for the
protection of the body of shareholders.8 5
The next major step in the legislative treatment of the ultra
vires problem came in 1929 as a result of provisions which were
82See Dodd & Baker, Cases and Materials on Corporations 377 n. 5 (2d ed.
1951), wherein the authors say, in commenting on the 'nowledge" provision in
the Michigan Corporation Act: "Query whether the meaning is that even if the
outsider has performed on his part and even though the benefit of his performance
has enured to the corporation, the latter may defeat his action on the contract by
a plea of ultra vires and force him to quasi-contract restitutional relief."
83 See Ballantine, Corporations see. 108, at 267 (rev. ed. 1946).
84 Jennings, "The Minnesota Business Corporation Act," 12 Wis. L. Rev. 419,
428-29 (1937).
85 Stevens, "Ultra Vires Transactions Under the New Ohio General Corpora-

tion Act,' 4 U. Cin. L. Rev. 419, 441 (1930).
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added to the corporation statutes of California 8 and which were
carried forward, with some modifications, into the new California
General Corporation Law of 1931.87 The essence of these provisions was to abolish completely the defense of ultra vires in
litigation between the corporation and third parties. The pertinent portion states that:
No limitation upon the business, purposes, or
powers of the corporation or upon the powers of the shareholders, officers, or directors, or the manner of exercise of
such powers, contained in or implied by the articles ...
shall be asserted as between the corporation or any shareholder and any third person. 88
A criticism which had been diredted at the proposed provisions of the Uniform Business Corporation Act was that they
failed "to go far enough in indicating what practical legal consequences and changes are intended to be produced."89 A later
commentary on the Uniform Act suggested that the generality
of the provisions concerning corporate capacity and authority
rendered the effect of the act "highly doubtful." 0 That this suggestion is of more than passing interest can be illustrated by reference to a case from the State of Washington,91 involving a corporation engaged in the manufacture of shingles which had, through
its president, guaranteed the payment of hospital expenses to be
incurred by a former employee of the corporation. In a suit by an
assignee of the hospital against the corporation under the guaranty, the Supreme Court of Washington, in a five to four decision,
denied recovery to the plaintiff on the ground that this was an
ultra vires contract in which no benefit had been received by the
corporation. Although Washington had adopted the Uniform
Business Corporation Act,92 there was no attempt in either the
majority or minority opinions to discuss the problem in terms of
'86 See Recent Legis., Ballantine, "Changes in the California Corporation Laws
(1929)," 17 Calif. L. Rev. 529, 532-33 (1929).
87 Cal. Civ. Code sec. 345 (Deering 1931). See Ballantine, "Questions of
Policy in Drafting a Modem Corporation Law," 19 Calif. L. Rev. 46, 478-75
(1931).
88
Cal. Corp. Code Ann. sec. 803(b) (Deering 1953).
89
Ballantine, 'Proposed Revision of the Ultra Vires Doctrine," 12 Cornell
L.Q. 453, 454 (1927).,
90 Legis. Note, "Statutory Modification of the Doctrine of Ultra Vires," 44
Harv.91L. Rev. 280, 282-83 (1930).
Millett v. Mackie Mill Co., 193 Wash. 477, 76 P.2d 311 (1938).
92 2 Wash. Rev. Code sec. 23.08 (1951).
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the agency principles contemplated by that act.9 3 In fact the
majority opinion showed considerable sympathy for the ultra vires
doctrine in these words:
To adopt a rule that would not allow the ultra vires
defense would endanger the investments and savings of
thousands of large and small investors who either own stock
or bonds of a corporation. Such a rule would leave it in the
power of managers or officers of large and small corporations to destroy the business of such corporations by making
improvident contracts contrary
to the business for which
94
they were incorporated.
In the face of language such as this it behooves draftsmen of
legislation to make their intent plain by clear and vigorous provisions if they are to succeed in bringing about a modification in
the established judicial attitude. To meet this need, an additional
provision was added to the California statute, which, in its present
form, reads as follows:
Any contract or conveyance made in the name of
a corporation which is authorized or ratified by the directors, or is done within the scope of the authority, actual or
apparent, given by the directors, except as their authority
is limited by law other than by Part 9 of this division [pertaining to dissolution], binds the corporation, and the
corporation acquires rights thereunder, whether the contract
is executed or wholly or in part executory. 95
It is eminently clear, therefore, that in California the door has
been closed to the plea of ultra vires in litigation between the
93 This situation is not peculiar to the State of Washington. It has manifested
itself in other states which have adopted the Uniform Act. See Stone, "Ultra
Vires and Original Sin," 14 TUl. L. Rev. 190, 208 n. 56 (1940), in which the
author said, referring to the distinction between executed and executory ultra vires
contracts: "It has become well settled in Louisiana despite the fact that Section 12
of Louisiana Act 250 of 1928 gives to every corporation the capacity possessed by
natural persons, a provision which was intended to render all contracts of a corporation for lawfud purposes enforceable in the courts."
94 76 P.2d at 314. There were two formal dissenting opinions. In one of
them, Justice Holcomb concluded that the contract of guaranty should be enforced
in view of the detriment suffered by the hospital in reliance upon the guaranty.
He said at 315: "Since the contract in question is neither illegal nor immoral and
was freely made by appellant [the corporation], good faith requires that it be
enforced. To deny its enforcement is to work a legal wrong and an injustice upon
respondent [assignee of claim] and the hospital."
95Cal. Corp. Code Ann. see. 803(c) (Deering 1953). Ballantine, commenting on the California statute, said that "the California committee has tried to
avoid furnishing diversion to the courts in the form of legislative enigmas, charades,
cross word puzzles or conundrums." Ballantine, 'Problems in Drafting a Modem
Corporation Law," 17 A.B.A.J. 579, 580 (1931).

KENTucKY LAw JouRNAL.

Vl 46,
6
[Vol.

corporation and third parties. The defense is not even preserved,
as in the 1927 Ohio Act, against those persons chargeable with
actual knowledge of the unauthorized exercise of power. In
answer to the question whether ultra vires should remain a defense in such cases, Professor Ballantine, draftsman of the California Act, answered that the stability of commercial transactions
militates against going into the matter of knowledge of power
and authority. He said that "persons dealing with corporations
should be enabled to rely on the authority of the directors and
should not have to consult attorneys on the frequently difficult
question of whether a transaction is intra vires or run the risk of
proving their ignorance of possible limitations on the authority
of the managing board."9 6 It is significant that Ohio has eliminated from its statute the clause pertaining to knowledge and
that the present provision in the new Ohio Corporation Law,
effective in 1955, contains a sweeping abrogation of the defense
of ultra vires similar to that which appears in the California Act."
Notwithstanding this vigorous treatment of the defense in
litigation between the corporation and third parties, the California Act and the Ohio Acts, both past and present, carefully
preserve the right of the state to object to ultra vires action by
corporations and the right of shareholders to bring suits against
directors and officers based on their violation of authority. The
California provision states that limitations on authority "may be
asserted in a proceeding by a shareholder or the State, to enjoin
the doing or continuation of unauthorized business by the corporation or its officers, or both, in cases where third parties have not
acquired rights thereby, or to dissolve the corporation, or in a
proceeding by the corporation or by the shareholders suing in a
96 Ballantine, "Questions of Policy in Drafting a Modem Corporation Law,"
19 Calif.
L. Rev. 465, 475 (1931).
97
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. sec. 1701.18(H) (Page, supp. 1956):
No lack of, or limitation upon, the authority of a corporation shall be asserted in any action except (1) by the state in an
action by its against the corporation, (2 by or one behalf of the
corporation against a director, an officer, or any shareholder as such,
(3) by a shareholder as such or by or on behalf of the holders of
shares of any class against the corporation, a director, an officer, or
any shareholder as such, or (4) in an action involving an alleged
overissue of shares. This division shall apply to any action brought
in this state upon any contract made in this state by a foreign corporation.
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representative suit, against the officers or directors of the corporation for violation of their authority."9 8
It will be noted that under this provision of the California
Act an injunction may be obtained only in cases "where third
parties have not acquired rights thereby." 99 It seems clear under
this provision that the injunctive process is to be available only
with regard to future unauthorized transactions and that it is not
to be used with regard to existing contracts since this would tend
to defeat the underlying purpose of the statute to free third parties
from the ultra vires defense.
On the other hand, the section pertaining to ultra vires in the
Minnesota Business Corporation Act, although preserving the
right of shareholders (or the state) to enjoin the doing or continuance of unauthorized acts, provides that in such cases "the
court shall protect or make compensation for rights which may
have been acquired by third parties by reason of the doing of any
unauthorized act by the corporation."' 0° This provision would
appear to cover existing as well as future transactions, and while
it seeks to protect the rights of third parties, it seems to weaken
considerably the statutory protection afforded innocent third
parties who may have inadvertently consummated an ultra vires
transaction with a corporation and who then find themselves
faced with protracted litigation to maintain their rights. Moreover, Professor Jennings, commenting on this provision, points
out that while the Minnesota Act seems to make even the wholly
executory contract enforceable, it is somewhat deceptive in this
respect since the reservation of the right to enjoin may result in
a corporation being compelled to breach a contract it is willing
to perform. 01' He compares in this respect the provisions of the
California Act which he concludes restrict the injunctive right to
situations where no rights at all have intervened, or, as he says,
"to situations where not even an executory contract has yet been
consummated." 02
98

Cal. Corp. Code Ann. sec. 803(a) (Deering 1953).
This phrase limiting use of the injunction to cases "where third parties have
not acquired rights thereby" was one of the changes made in the section when it
was revised in the 1931 Act. See Report of Legislative Counsel, as quoted in the
notes to Cal. Civ. Code sec. 345 (1931).
100 2 Minn. Stat. sec. 301.12 (1953).
101 Jennings, supra note 84, at 429-30.
102 Id. at 430.
99
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Shortly after the advent of the California Act of 1931, a new
Business Corporation Act appeared in the State of Illinois. 103

This act, which became effective in 1938, modified somewhat the
California treatment of the ultra vires defense. The Illinois statute
begins with a general statement that no act of the corporation
nor any conveyance of property to or by the corporation is to be
considered invalid by reason of the fact the corporation lacked
capacity or power to so act.104 There then follow three specific
instances in which the lack of capacity or power may be asserted:
(1) in a proceeding by a shareholder against the corporation to
secure an injunction, (2) in a proceeding by the corporation
against officers and directors, and (3) in a proceeding by the state
to dissolve the corporation or to enjoin the corporation from the

transaction of unauthorized business. 0 5 It is the first exception
which is of immediate interest, since it is buttressed in the statute
by a rather elaborate provision outlining the scope and effect of
the injunctive right given to the individual shareholder. It is
provided in substance that if the injunction is sought in relation
to acts under a contract to which the corporation is a party, the

court may set aside and enjoin the performance of such contract
if all of the parties to the contract are parties to the suit and if
the court deems an injunction to be equitable. In granting an

injunction the court is directed to allow compensation for loss or
damage which either the corporation or other parties may suffer
as a result of the setting aside of the contract except that no al-

lowance is to be made for anticipated profits to be derived from
the performance of the contract. 10 6

103 See Katz, "The Illinois Business Corporation Act," 12 Wis. L. Rev. 473
(1937); Little, "The Illinois Business Corporation Law," 28 Il. L. Rev. 997
19341. Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 32, sec. 157.8 (1957). The original section as it ap-

peared in the 1933 Act contained a separate provision pertaining to conveyances
which to some extent overlapped the provision concerning contract rights. The
draftsmen of the Illinois Act explained that this was done because the Illinois law
with reference to titles in ultra vires transactions was in such doubt that it seemed
desirable to insert a provision with respect to titles separate from the one dealing
with contract rights. See Illinois Business Corporation Act Annotated 60 (1934).
Rev. Stat. c. 32, see. 157.8 (1957).
105 1 ]1M.
106 Ibid. As to the factors which should govern the determination as to when
injunctive relief would be "equitable," the draftsmen suggested that it would
seem entirely just to set a contract aside where the outsider knew that the corporation was acting without authority and where the shareholders had not authorized
or acquisced in the transaction. See Illinois Business Corporation Act Annotated
61 (1934). A commentator on the act suggested that the extent of performance
under the contract, whether executory or executed, might be of importance. See
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This Illinois provision, on the one hand, by specifically recognizing the propriety of an injunction as to existing as well as future
contracts, appears to be more liberal than the provision for injunctions in the California Act, and, on the other hand, appears to be
more restrictive than the corresponding provision in the Minnesota Act, where, it will be recalled, there was no direction in
granting injunctions to ignore anticipated profits in protecting the
rights of third parties. Professor Ballantine, a leading exponent
of the view that third parties should be insulated from the plea
of ultra vires in commercial transactions, made the following
critical observation of the Illinois provision:
This perpetuates much of the old uncertainty and
confusion as to the validity of legal transactions which have
been some of the worst evils of the doctrine of ultra vires.
Such vague, timorous and uncertain provisions are likely to
confuse the courts, encourage litigation, unsettle contracts
and accomplish no good purpose. Does it not seem an outrage upon the third party to make a contract authorized by
the directors binding on him, but not on the corporation if
the corporation can persuade some shareholder to bring
suit for an injunction and recission? This enables the corporation to speculate at the expense of the third party and
deprives a third party contracting with a corporation in
good faith of the anticipated profits of his partly executed
contract, while
reserving a right to such profits to the
07
corporation.
Despite this vigorous criticism of the Illinois provision, the
Committee on Business Corporations of the American Bar Association, in preparing a Model Business Corporation Act, which
was presented in 1950 (as revised) for use by states in preparing
revisions of their corporation codes,0 8 adopted the Illinois apNote, Richardson, "Ultra Vires Under the Illinois Business Corporation Act," 29
I11.
L. Rev. 1075, 1081 (1935). In Schipper v. Block& Kuhl Co., 283 Ill. App. 486,
494-95 (1936), the court said that the section did not give stockholders a right to
sue inequity which they did not have at common law and that the application of
the injunctive provision must be governed by established principles of equity.
107 Ballantine, "A Critical Survey of the Illinois Business Corporation Act,"

1 U. Chi. L. Rev. 357, 382 (1934). In reply to this criticism the draftsmen of the
Illinois Act said that they were unwilling to follow the California precedent in

completely abolishing the doctrine of ultra vires as to outsiders and that the Illinois
provision "was designed to permit the courts to work out just solutions in cases
in which the Calfforuia provision would operate unjustly." Illinois Business
Corporation Act Annotated 61 (1934).
108See American Law Institute, Model Business Corporation Act (Revised
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proach to the treatment of ultra vires. 0 9 The provision for injunctive relief by shareholders was liberalized even further under this
new act. Whereas the Illinois Act states that in setting aside and
enjoining the performance of an ultra vires contract the court
shall allow compensation for loss or damage sustained by either
party resulting from such action, the Model Act merely states that
the court may do this. Such change from mandatory to permissive
language no doubt serves to intensify the criticism which Professor Ballantine had directed at the Illinois provision, but the prestige of the Model Act gives to its provisions an importance that
cannot be overlooked.
Since 1950, seven states, Maryland, 110 North Carolina,"',
North Dakota,112 Oregon,"1 3 Texas, 114 Virginia, 11 and Wisconsin,116 as well as the District of Columbia," 7 have adopted new or
revised corporation acts which contain a section on ultra vires
either the same as or substantially similar to the one contained in
the Model Act. Pennsylvania, in its Business Corporation Law of
1933,118 had already aligned itself with this group of jurisdictions
by adoption of a section which closely followed the Illinois provision. Alaska is reported to have adopted a new corporation act,
1950), published by the Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the American Law Institute, collaborating with the American Bar Association.
109 Id., sec. 6. The close affinity between the Illinois Act and the Model Act
is explained by the fact that the Model Act was prepared from the Illinois Act
and drafted by a subcommittee whose members had participated in the preparation of the Illinois Act. See Campbell, "The Model Business Corporation Act," 11
Business Lawyer, July 1956, p. 98, 100. A major project is now in progrc s to
annotate the provisions of the Model Act. See Seward, "The Project of the American Bar Foundation to Annotate the Model Business Corporation Act and the
Model Non-Profit Corporation Act," 11 Business Lawyer, April 1956, p. 4.
110 1 Md. Ann. Code Gen. Laws art. 23, sec. 120 (Flack 1951).
11l 2B N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. sec. 55-18 (Supp. 1955).
112 N.D. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 102, sec. 6.
113 1 Ore. Rev. Stat. sec. 57.040 (1955 repl. part).
114 1 Tex. Stat. Rev. Civ. (Vernon, Supp. 1956, at 193, 202-03).
115 3 Va. Code Ann. sec. 13.1-5 (1956 repl. vol.).
1161 wis. Stat. sec. 180.06 (1955).
17D.C.
Code Ann. sec. 29-905 (Supp. V 1956).
118
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, sec. 2852-303 (Purdon, penn. ed. 1938). The
Pennsylvania statute also contains provisions derived from the Uniform Business
Corporation Act on corporate capacity and constructive notice. Pa. Stat. Ann.,
supra, secs. 2852-9, 2852-301. For a general discussion of the Pennsylvania provisions, see Legis. Note, "Ultra Vires Under the Pennsylvania Business Corporation
Act," 10 Temp. L.Q. 418 (1936). The Pennsylvania legislature has enacted a
comprehensive revision of the Business Corporation Law, effective September 1,
1957. See 1 P-H Corp. Serv., Report Bulletin No. 4, Aug. 21, 1957, p. 1-3.
However, no changes were made in the sections bearing on ultra vires. See 4 P-H
Corp. Serv. (Pa.) 15, 24, 32-83 (1957).
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effective June 27, 1957, based on the provisions of the Model
Act.119 It is assumed that the section on ultra vires in the Model
Act was accepted without change. If so, this makes eleven jurisdictions within the continental United States that now apply the
Illinois approach to the subject of ultra vires, and the popularity
of the Model Act as a source from which to prepare modernized
business corporation statutes may well lead to a further increase
in the number of jurisdictions subscribing to this method of
handling the problem. 20 Of the present group, only North Carolina has sought to meet the criticism voiced by Professor Ballantine as to the injunctive provisions of the Illinois Act. In its new
Business Corporation Act, effective July 1, 1957, there is added
to the provision which preserves the right of a shareholder to
bring a suit for an injunction the requirement that "in any such
action the plaintiff shall sustain the burden of proof that he has
not at any time prior thereto assented to the act or transfer in
question and that in bringing the action he is not acting in collusion with officials of the corporation."' 2'
Although the Illinois approach has proven popular, the California treatment is not without its adherents. In addition to Ohio,
122
which as previously indicated has converted itself to this view,
the states of Nevada' 3 and Oklahoma 124 have adopted statutory
provisions designed to abolish completely the defense of ultra
119 See 1 P-H Corp. Serv., Report Bulletin No. 23, May 15, 1957, p. 7.
120 Seven jurisdictions have to date adopted new corporation acts based

largely on the Model Act. They are: Alaska, District of Columbia, North Dakota,
Oregon, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Scott, "Developments in Corporate
Laws," 12 Business Lawyer 438, 452 (1957). Although the new North Carolina

Business Corporation Act apparently was based also on the Model Act, George C.
Seward, Chairman of the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association said at the time

of its adoption that "the general spirit of the proposed act differs from the model
act to such an extent that the Committee on Corporate Laws prefers to deny any

kinship." Seward, supra note 109, at 4. It is reported that the State Bar Association of Arkansas is working on a new corporation law based on the Model
Act, that Colorado has completed preparation of such an act which awaits action
by the legislature, and that the State Bar Association of South Dakota has appointed
study p.the
Bulletin aNo.committee
22, May 1,to 1957,
2-8.Model Act. See 1 P-H Corp. Serv., Report
121 2B N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. sec. 55-18(a)(1) (Supp. 1955).
122 See note 97 supra.
12031 Nev. Rev. Stat. sec. 78.135 (1955). Nevada has also indirectly affected
the ultra vires problem by its "all-purpose provision whereby it is deemed sufficient to state in the articles of incorporation that the corporation may engage in
"any lawful activity." 1 Nev. Rev. Stat. sec. 78.035(3) (1955). A similar "allpurpose" clause appears in the new Wisconsin Business Corporation Law. See 1
Wis. 124
Stat. sec. 180.45(1)(c) (1955).
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, see. 1.29 (1951).
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vires in litigation between the corporation and third parties. One
state, Florida,'25 has enacted legislation similar to that of Vermont,
but the Florida legislation, like that of Vermont, while recognizing
the basic philosophy that ultra vires should be eliminated as a
defense, in terms applies the limitation only to the corporation in
suits brought against it.1 26 Another state, Missouri, 27 has an even
more limited provision of this general type, making conveyances
of property to or by a corporation immune from collateral attack,
but failing to extend this protection to contracts generally.
One of the most comprehensive statutes in this group of states
is no doubt the one contained in the Oklahoma Business Corporation Act. In addition to a section emphasizing the responsibility
of the corporate representatives to recognize the limitations on
corporate authority as defined in the articles of incorporation and
authorizing proceedings for "proper relief" where such authority
has been exceeded, 128 the act contains an additional section which
seeks to spell out carefully the legal position of the corporation
and third parties in ultra vires transactions. It is provided that
the defense of ultra vires is not to be asserted as to any "contract,
conveyance, undertaking, or tortious act," whether executed or
executory, if:
(1) Such contract, conveyance, undertaking, or
tortious act was authorized or ratified by its board of directors or shareholders;
(2) With knowledge, actual or constructive, of the facts,
the benefits or any part thereof of such transaction have
been accepted or retained by the parties so asserting; or
(3) The articles of incorporation of such corporation be
ambiguous as to the scope of its corporate purposes and
under any reasonable interpretation of the articles of incorporation as relied upon by any third party, or his privy,
12the transaction in question would have been authorized. a
One writer, commenting on this Oklahoma provision, has suggested that if no reasonable interpretation of the articles brings
a transaction within the purposes of the corporation, then it apFla. Stat. sec. 608.50 (1955).
section provides: "The defense of ultra vires shall not be available
to a corporationsued on a contract or other obligation." (Emphasis added.)
127 II Mo. Rev. Stat. sec. 351.395 (1949).
128 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, sec. 1.28 (1951). The Act also contains a section
declaring general corporate capacity. See Okla. Stat. Ann. supra, sec. 1.18.
129 Id. sec. 1.29.
1252

126The
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pears the corporation is eligible to raise the plea of ultra vires as
to a person with knowledge of those purposes. 130 This suggested
interpretation has plausibility, particularly if emphasis is placed
on paragraph three of the quoted series of alternatives. The result
reached, however, seems to be at variance with the draftsmen's
intent as to the scope of this provision which the writer acknowledges was completely to cut off ultra vires as a defense in any contract, transfer or tort action.' 3 ' If emphasis is placed on the broad
language of the first alternative, then it would appear that the
statutory inhibition as to asserting the ultra vires defense would
prevail if the transaction was authorized or ratified by the board
of directors (or shareholders) irrespective of the state of knowledge or lack of knowledge on the part of third parties as to the
scope of the corporate purposes set forth in the articles of incorporation. 2
This attempt at completeness in the Oklahoma Act indicates
another potential pitfall facing the legislative draftsman. The
specific enumeration of instances in which the defense is not to
be raised may lead to the possible interpretation that in other instances not within the scope of one or more of the enumerations
the defense is to be allowed. If, therefore, it was the intent of the
draftsmen of the Oklahoma Act to completely abolish the defense,
then, as the writer referred to above said of the Oklahoma provision, "it appears to be a strikingly complex method of reaching
1 33
a result attainable by a direct prohibition."
The provisions of the Uniform Business Corporation Act relating to corporate capacity and constructive notice constitute the
legislative treatment in three states, Idaho, 3 4 Louisiana, 3 5 and
13 0 Vliet, "The Oklahoma Business Corporation Act II. A Survey," 2 Okla.
L. Rev. 177, 192,93 (1949).
131 Id. at 192.
132 See Draftsman's Note, 18 Okla. Stat. Ann. see. 1.29, at 370-71 (penn. ed.
1953), wherein it is said: "On the matter of whether or not knowledge on the part
of the contracting party without the corporation . .. should let in the attack of
ultra vires is a disputed question. Ballantine says it should not. Minn., and Mich.,
have provided otherwise while Calif. and IMl.did not insert such provision. We
adopted what we consider a desirable intermediate ground; that is, that knowledge alone will not let in the plea, but if there is the added element that such
party reasonably should know that the agents of the corporation are acting without
authority of the board of directors, etc., and the acts would not be approved or
ratified later by the directors or shareholders, then and only then, can ultra vires,
be pleaded
and then only on behalf of the corporation."
'" 3 Vliet, supra note 130, at 192.
134 5 Idaho Code Ann. sees. 30-113, 30-114 (1947).
135 La. Rev. Stat. tit. 12, sees. 11, 12 (1950).
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Washington. 36 These states, therefore, may be classed as states
which have, legislatively at least, adopted the agency solution to
the ultra vires problem. Indiana has a provision on corporate
capacity similar to the one contained in the Uniform Act, 37 but
has no provision as to constructive notice. The legislative mandate therefore for placing ultra vires in the agency hopper is not
as compelling as that of the Uniform Act. However, the significance of the distinction between corporate capacity and corporate authority dictated by this provision makes it seem appropriate to place Indiana in the group of states which have adopted
the legislative plan of solving ultra vires problems by application
of agency law. 38
Kentucky is listed in Uniform Laws Annotated as one of the
states (along with Idaho, Louisiana, and Washington) which has
adopted a corporation law based on the Uniform Act.130 While it
is true that when Kentucky revised its corporation laws in 1946,
it made considerable use of the provisions of the Uniform Act,
nevertheless there were many omissions from, changes in, and
additions to these provisions. Of particular interest and importance in the present connection was the complete omission of
the provision in Section 11 concerning corporate capacity. Despite, therefore, the inclusion of Section 10 on constructive
notice, 40 this leaves Kentucky without the full statutory plan contemplated under the Uniform Act and in an even more uncertain
position as to the effect of ultra vires under its business corporation act than is sometimes asserted as to those states which enacted both sections of the Uniform Act, or which might be asserted as to Indiana with its lone provision on corporate capacity.
136 2 Wash. Rev. Code secs. 23.08.060, 23.08.070 (1951).
6 Ind. Stat. Ann. sec. 25-202 (Burns, 1948 repl.).
138 For a discussion of the implications of the Indiana provision, see Note,

'37

"Ultra Vires Acts in Indiana,' 16 Ind. L.J. 587 (1941). The Indiana Act contains

an additional provision authorizing the prosecuting attorney of the county in
which the principal office of the corporation is located to bring a suit against the
corporation to avoid ultra vires acts, for which he is to receive a fee of $50. See 6
,Id. Stat. Ann. sec. 25-253 (Bums, 1948 repl.). It has been said of this provision:
"No policy is served by authorizing criminal prosecutions for harmless mistakes
and deviations from limitations on the business set up by the articles when these
are frequently copied by the stenographer from the nearest form book without
any serious consideration." Ballantine, Corporations see. 108, at 268 (rev. ed.

1946).

'39

(1957).

140

See Table of States Wherein Act Has Been Adopted in 9 U.L.A. 115

Ky.Rev. Stat. 271.115 (1956).
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Whatever justification there may be for according Indiana a position in the list of states that have given legislative treatment to
the doctrine of ultra vires, the presence of a provision on constructive notice standing alone hardly seems sufficient to enable one
to classify Kentucky as a state which has adopted a legislative
plan for the treatment of ultra vires acts.
CONCLUSION

It is evident from the foregoing statutory analysis that legislation on the subject of ultra vires has not been uniform. The
statutes may be grouped into four general classifications: (1) the
"agency" type, exemplified by the Uniform Business Corporation
Act, (2) the "knowledge" type, exemplified by the former Ohio
statute and the present statutes of Kansas, Michigan, and Minnesota, (3) the "Illinois" type, now embodied in the Model Business Corporation Act, and (4) the "California" type, reflected
in the present Ohio statute and in the statutes of Nevada and
Oklahoma as well as California.
These differences in treatment reflect the different attitudes
which have developed as to the most desirable solution to the
policy question which underlies the ultra vires problem. That
question is how far the interests of the shareholders demand protection through permitting the defense of lack of corporate power
to be raised in private litigation between the corporation and
third parties. Professor Ballantine persuasively argued that "the
supposed interests of the shareholders have been given exaggerated regard over those of third persons who have dealt with
the corporation or its representatives." 141 He added that "the
much needed attempts of modern corporation acts to eliminate
from the law the evils, quibbles and uncertainties of the pathological, ill-founded decisions on ultra vires, in many states still fall
short of attaining the mark aimed at, viz., of making law clear and
certain
,,142in upholding corporate dealings authorized by the directors."This observation has direct application to the "agency"
type and "knowledge" type statutes. If the promotion of stability
in commercial transactions is the aim of such legislation, then the
observation likewise may be applied to the "Illinois" type statute,
since its provision permitting the setting aside of existing con141
142

Ballantine, Corporations see. 89, at 241 (rev. ed. 1946).
Id. sec. 108, at 263.
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tracts in suits brought by shareholders necessarily leaves an ultra
vires transaction with an outsider vulnerable to possible later attack.
The present writer believes, as Ballantine did, that the interests of the shareholders do not call for this much protection
when to allow it tends to unsettle the finality of the business
transaction. Rather it seems sufficient if shareholders are given
appropriate relief within the corporation against the officers or
directors who have been responsible for the unauthorized business. This can be accomplished, as Ballantine suggested, through
provisions for injunctive relief against the continuance of such
unauthorized business and for the recovery of damages on behalf
of the corporation against wrongdoing officers or directors for
losses incurred in transactions already completed.,4 3 This is not to
say that third parties should be immune from suit where they
have, in collusion with the officers of the corporation, attempted
to perpetrate a fraud on the corporation and its stockholders.
Here relief is no doubt available independently of the law of ultra
vires. But it is to say that in those instances where the only objection to the transaction is that it exceeded the powers of the
corporation, third parties are entitled to insulation from harassing
litigation instituted by shareholders of the corporation. 4 4 The
interests of the state, that is, the public generally, can be protected
through recognition of the right of the state to bring a direct suit
45
against the corporation for forfeiture of the corporate charter1
or against the corporation and its directors146for injunctive relief
from the continuance of ultra vires business.
143 Id. sec. 108, at 268.
144 While it is true that collusion between third parties and corporate officers
may exist short of actual fraud and that the remedy of the stockholder against
wrongdoing officers in a derivative suit is not always feasible, it still may be
doubted whether permitting the ultra vires plea to be raised in such cases either
directly or through a suit for injunctive relief to set aside the contract is not too
high a price to pay for the protection of the stockholders' interests. But see
Mangum, "The Doctrine of Ultra Vires in North Carolina," 20 N.C.L. Rev. 405,
418 (1942).
145 It is so provided in Section 6 of the Model Act. See also Cal. Corp. Code
Ann. sec. 803(a) (Deering 1953); 1 IM. Rev. Stat. c. 32, sec. 157.8 (1957). In
Kentucky the General Corporation Law speaks of proceedings by the Attorney
General "to revoke its corporate powers" where a corporation is guilty of abuse
or misuse of corporate power. See Ky. Rev. Stat. 271.590 (1956).
146 Professor Stevens has even expressed doubt "whether the state's interest
in transactions which are merely ultra vires . . . is sufficient to justify either an
injunction against threatened ultra vires action or an ouster for past ultra vires
action." Stevens, Private Corporations sec. 69, at 316 (2d ed. 1949).
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It is believed that the foregoing objectives can best be met
by a statute prepared with the basic philosophy of the California
Act in mind. However, a possible change in the wording of Section 803(b) of the California Act might be considered. It will be
recalled that this provision states that "no limitation upon the
business, purposes, or powers of the corporation or upon the
powers of the shareholders, officers, or directors, or the manner
of exercise of such powers, contained in or implied by the articles
...
shall be asserted as between the corporation or any shareholder and any third person." 47 This language is broad in scope

and appears to cover cases involving irregular'exercise of power
as well as cases involving want or abuse of power. The provision
thus goes beyond ultra vires as understood in its strict and primary sense. It may be doubted whether such an extension is wise
since it has the potential effect of making restrictions which appear in the articles as to the mode and manner by which corporate
power is to be exercised, and by whom, less binding on third
parties with knowledge of such restrictions than would be true
if the restrictions appeared in the by-laws. Ballantine apparently
justified a result such as this on the theory that by-law provisions
are drawn with much more serious regard for limitations on
authority and are therefore entitled to more respect.148 This justification, however, appears somewhat forced when applied to irregular exercises of admitted power, for it would seem that, since
articles are frequently more difficult to amend than by-laws, if
those responsible for such restrictions took the precaution of
placing the restrictions in the articles rather than in the by-laws,
they must have intended that such restrictions be given more
than the usual attention by persons both within and without the
corporation. Therefore, it seems somewhat dubious to extend the
drastic treatment accorded ultra vires by this type of legislation
49
beyond the strict and primary meaning of the term.1

In those states where the climate of opinion may not be receptive to the complete abrogation of the ultra vires defense achieved
by a "California" type statute, the more flexible provisions of the
147 (Emphasis added.) See note 88 supra.

See Ballantine, Corporations sec. 108, at 267 (rev. ed. 1946).
Language in the Nevada and Texas acts appears to raise a similar problem
in those states. See 1 Nev. Rev. Stat. sec. 78.135, clause 2 (1955); Texas Business
Corporation Act, Art. 2.04 B., 1 Tex. Stat. Rev. Civ. (Vernon, Supp. 1957, at 202).
148
149
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Model Business Corporation Act are available for adoption."1 0
However, if a statute of this latter type is adopted, it is believed
that serious consideration should be given to three possible
alterations in the provision for injunctive relief by shareholders:
(1) use of the word "shall" instead of "may" in the clause pertaining to the allowance of compensation for loss or damage, as
has been done in the Illinois Act,' (2) inclusion of an additional
clause pertaining to collusive suits as has been done in the recent
North Carolina Act,'52 and (8) deletion of the clause prohibiting
the court from taking anticipated profits into account 513when
awarding compensation where injunctive relief is granted.
While a statutory provision abolishing the doctrine of constructive notice as to charter provisions is probably not necessary
under a "California" type statute where the defense of ultra vires
is completely abrogated as to third persons, 4 there is some reason to believe such a provision could have importance under the
"Illinois" type statute, since otherwise a court would be left free
to make constructive notice a basis for granting equitable relief
under the injunctive provision.' 55 In view of the fact that a provision on constructive notice may have value beyond the ultra
vires problem in making clear the purpose served by the requirement that articles of incorporation be filed in a public office, it is
believed a section patterned along the lines of the one found in
the Uniform Act 56 and made a part of the series of provisions
dealing with the preparation and filing of the articles of incorporation would be a desirable, if not 57indispensable, addition to any
modern business corporation act.
150 We are told that the fear of legislative hostility to the section on ultra

vires in the Illinois Business Corporation Act was in part responsible for the inclusion of the clause for injunctive relief by shareholders and that much of the
hostile criticism which did develop was placated by inclusion of this provision. See
Little, supra note 103, at 1003-04 n. 6.
151 The Pennsylvania Act also contains the mandatory word "shall." See Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 15, sec. 2852-803 (Purdon, perm. ed. 1938).
152

See note 121 supra.

153 See the criticism of such a clause in Mangunm, supra note 144, at 418-19.
154 See Ballantine, Corporations sec. 108, at 266 (rev. ed. 1946).
155 This possibility was soon detected in connection with the Illinois Act,
which contains no constructive notice provision, but the likelihood of a court considering the mere existence of constructive notice as a sufficient ground for equitable relief was thought to be remote. See Note, Richardson, supra note 106, at

1082-83.

156 See note 73 supra.
157 Several of the existing statutes extend the operation of the ultra vires pro-

visions to foreign corporations. For example, clause (d) of the California statute
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It is perhaps too much to assume that absolute uniformity in
corporation statutes can or will be achieved. Even the committee
which worked so energetically on the Model Business Corporation
Act had no such illusion in the preparation of that act. Nevertheless, as Willard P. Scott, a member of this committee, said recently
in commenting on corporate law revisions, "inability to obtain
perfection is no excuse for failure to make progress.".15 It is believed, therefore, that those states, including Kentucky, which
now have no legislation directed specifically at the ultra vires
problem, will wish to give serious consideration to the enactment
of appropriate legislation on this subject, so that their states may
be added to the growing list of jurisdictions that are contributing,
through legislation, to "the decline and fall of the doctrine of
ultra vires." 159 Furthermore, it is assumed that those states which
at present have legislative provisions on the subject will wish to
avail themselves of the opportunity to reconsider the adequacy
of such provisions as a part of the "modernization" process which
is constantly necessary to keep corporation codes abreast of current business and legal developments.
reads: "This section applies to contracts and conveyances made by foreign corporations in this State and to all conveyances by foreign corporations of real property
situated in this State." Cal. Corp. Code Ann. sec. 803(d) (Deering 1953).
This provision was introduced into the California statute at the time of the
1931 revision. Professor Ballantine commented: "An interesting feature of the new
California provision . . . is extending its doctrine to contracts and conveyances
made by foreign corporations in the state, a matter which ordinarily might be
regarded as one affecting the internal authority or affairs of the corporation and
as such governed by the law of the domicile." Ballantine, "Problems in Drafting
a Modem Corporation Law," 17 A.B.A.J. 579, 580 (1931).
Similar provisions appear in the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law, the
present Ohio General Corporation Law and the new North Carolina Business
Corporation Act. See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, sec. 2852-303 C (Purdon, perm. ed.
1938); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. sec. 1701,13(H) (Page, supp. 1956); 2B N.C. Gen.
Stat. Ann. sec. 55-18(b) (Supp. 1955). See also 3 Mich. Comp. Laws sec. 450.11
(1948).
The propriety of these provisions would appear to be confirmed under Restatement, Conflicts see. 166, Comment c., which takes the position that the effect of
an ultra vires act is to be determined by the law of the state where the act is done.
158 Scott, supra note 120, at 453.
15 9 Berle, "The Modem Corporation in the Modem State," 8 Business Lawyer,
Nov. 1952, p. 3, 7.
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